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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ their professional achievements under state socialism to avoid being seen as collaborators. 3 Monuments commemorating the victims of communism and museums condemning the communist rule have sprung up in virtually every post-socialist country, often with direct support from newly established, fiercely anti-communist political elites. 4 However, a focus on the ability of present interests to remould our perceptions of the past is only part of the story. The past is certainly, as Steinmetz puts it, 'narratively promiscuous' 5 : the very same event or experience can become incorporated into a range of distinct, even entirely incompatible recollections. Yet this is not to say that the possibilities for the remaking of the past are boundless, or down to chance and individual whims. As Schudson argues, 'there are limits to the power of actors in the present to remake the past according to their own interests', and studies of memory 'should try to understand not only how people use the past but how the past confines the uses to which people may intentionally put it'. 6 This article focuses on the role of generational cohorts as an anchor of continuity in memory-formation in the post-socialist context. It does not take much to
show that a thorough reconfiguration of memory at mass level is contingent on generational shifts. It often takes a new generation for the new reading of history to become taken for granted or for a particularly difficult chapter in a nation's past to be reopened and scrutinized afresh. In post-war Germany, the coming of age of the first post-war generation provided the necessary social context for raising embarrassing questions about war-time collaboration, and brought a new cohort of history teachers eager to engage with the Nazi past. 7 In Austria, the Waldheim affair divided the population along generational lines: a 1988 poll revealed that those over fifty were twice as likely to see Austria as a victim rather than as an accomplice of the Anschluss. 8 Likewise, in post-Franco Spain, it took a whole generation for the nation to unearth its dictatorial past, along with the mass graves dating from the Spanish Civil War. 9 Despite considerable evidence of the link between generational cohorts and mnemonic persistence in other social and historical contexts, existing research on post-socialist memory tends to focus primarily on evidence of mnemonic change. In contrast, this article seeks to develop a more nuanced understanding of post-socialist memories, one capable of accounting for both mnemonic change and persistence. 
Memories between the past and the present
Much of the classic sociological work on memory focuses on the malleability of memory, and on the ways in which memories of the past are repeatedly remoulded to suit the beliefs, interests and power struggles of the present. This 'presentist' approach was apparent already in Halbwachs' seminal work on collective memory, especially in his analysis of the changing perceptions of Jerusalem among successive generations of Jewish, Roman, Christian and Muslim pilgrims, 10 and was particularly prominent in Hobsbawm and Ranger's collection of essays on the invention of tradition.
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Similar arguments persist in more recent literature. In his study of American public commemorations over the course of the twentieth century, Bodnar argues that the key focus of these events was not the past or its preservation, but the changing nature of power in the present. Any future commemorations will follow the same logic: 'public memory will change again as political power and social arrangements change'. 12 Studies of nostalgia -including the growing literature on post-socialist nostalgia -likewise emphasize the power of the present to reshape the past.
According to Berdahl, the explosion of nostalgia in the former GDR is closely tied to processes of post-socialist transition, and therefore 'tells us more about the present than the past'. 13 A study of memories in post-socialist Serbia echoes this conclusion:
'Nostalgia for socialism […] reveals itself as a constitutive element of the present […] and is not a collection of questionable memories of an even more questionable past, which has to be reconsidered, reevaluated, and eventually overcome.' 14 Other authors, however, have pointed to the limits of the presentist approach and suggested that it overestimates the power of the present and fails to capture the elements of continuity in memory formation across time. Established representations of the past, claims Coser, are kept alive alongside contemporary revisions, and collective memory inevitably consists of 'partial continuity as well as new readings of the past in terms of the present'. 15 Schwartz reaches a similar conclusion in his study of the changing memories of George Washington, in which he shows that with the passage of time, new images of Washington's personality and life were superimposed over older ones, but could never replace them entirely. 16 Italian nationalist parties at the height of the border dispute over half a century ago.
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It is also worth noting that within historiographical debates, related points were raised with regard to constructivist approaches to history. For instance, in his landmark study of the production of Haitian history, Michel-Rolph Trouillot persuasively argues that the materiality of the socio-historical process inevitably sets limits for future historical narratives and that as a result, despite the irreducible gap between what happened and that which is said to have happened, 'not any fiction can pass as history'.
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Critics of the presentist approach offer a range of reasons for, and types of, the persistence of the past. Schwartz points to the constraints imposed by existing memories themselves, which act as 'frameworks of meaning' for understanding present experiences. 19 In a similar fashion, Markovits and Reich argue that existing patterns of collective memory can influence a country's choice of foreign policies. 20 In contrast, Schudson looks for carriers of mnemonic persistence beyond memories themselves, and identifies three: individuals with their personal memories, social vehicles such as legislation and cultural carriers such as new linguistic expressions. 21 Olick and Robbins approach the persistence of the past in a somewhat different manner, identifying three different types based on the mechanisms of mnemonic continuity: instrumental persistence, which involves a conscious preservation of a particular memory to achieve present goals; cultural persistence, which stems from the cultural relevance of existing memories to new contexts; and inertial persistence, which results from the habitual reproduction of established memories. 22 Pre-print version. Final version to be published in Contemporary European History 23(3), 2014.
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General theoretical reflections on the persistence of memory only rarely explicitly engage with the role of generation, birth cohorts or age in mnemonic change and continuity, even though empirical studies repeatedly acknowledge that people of different ages, or people born at different points in time, tend to remember the same events differently. The classic explanation for the generational stratification of memory was derived from Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. 23 According to
Mannheim, members of the same generational cohort share 'a common location in the social and historical process', which 'limits them to a specific range of potential experiences' and predisposes them 'for a characteristic mode of thought and experience'. 24 Experiences gained during late adolescence and early adulthood tend to be particularly important, and exert a lasting impact throughout adult life: 'All later experiences then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification or its negation and antithesis'. 25 As a result, each generational cohort, although coexisting with other cohorts, will share a distinctive pattern of behaviour and outlook, rooted in experiences gained during early adulthood.
Building on Mannheim's insights as well as on other sources, a range of research conducted from a variety of disciplinary and methodological perspectives confirmed that the same applies to the generational stratification of memories.
According to a sociological study based on a national sample of U.S. respondents, the vast majority of major national and international events remembered as particularly important occurred at a time when the respondents were in their late teens or early twenties. 26 Similar patterns were found in a number of other large-scale studies, conducted across a range of different countries and cultural environments, and from different disciplinary perspectives. 27 This is not to say that the most vivid memories These arguments are of particular relevance to arguments developed in this article. They suggest that generational cohorts born during or even before socialism are less likely to accept the subsequent rewriting of memory at face value, and might instead act as 'carriers of the past' and ensure its persistence in the present. Curiously, existing research on post-socialist memories fails to consider the possible impact of generational differences, despite acknowledging that recollections of the socialist past vary significantly with the age of the interviewee. For instance, a study conducted among the Bosnian diaspora in the United States revealed markedly different perceptions of the Yugoslav president Tito; while respondents who grew up under socialism were nostalgic for the late leader and emphasized his role in creating a modern, secular Bosnian nation, interviewees born towards the end of, or after the socialist period perceived Tito as an oppressor of Muslims. 35 Similar patterns of cohort-based stratification of memory were found also in eastern Germany and in post-Soviet Russia. In both cases, memories of those educated in the socialist era differed markedly from the recollections recounted by those who completed most of their education after 1991. 36 However, these cohort-based differences were interpreted from the perspective of mnemonic change rather than persistence. The positive perceptions of Tito among older Bosnians were thus seen as 'an ongoing negotiation over what it means to be Bosnian in a world without Yugoslavia' and as testimony of the 'constantly changing past'. 37 Likewise, the lack of knowledge about World War
Two among Russians educated after 1991 was presented as evidence of the swift dissipation of memory previously supported by the state and the state-sponsored educational system. 38 The fact that the very same body of evidence could be used to demonstrate the persistence of the past (among cohorts that were born and grew up during socialism) was simply overlooked.
Generational differences also feature in another body of literature of relevance to the case study presented in this article, namely the literature on borders. The ItaloYugoslav border itself has attracted substantial scholarly attention, and some of these studies have also specifically focused on the formation of memories in the border context. Most prominently, Pamela Ballinger's study of historical memory and cultural identity around Trieste and on the Istrian peninsula notes generational differences in the accounts of experiences of Italian exiles from Istria, as well as the partial cross-generational transmission of accounts and attitudes, including ethnic stereotypes. 39 In contrast, Tammy Smith's work comes closer to a presentist argument and puts more emphasis on mnemonic change; one of her contributions thus seeks to demonstrate the force of institutionally supported narratives and their ability to influence even the memories of the most decisive events of one's life, 40 while another examines the changing narrative structures of memories shared by Italian and
Yugoslav Istrians who meet in New York. 41 It is worth noting that the theme of continuity and discontinuity is prominent also in studies of another issue central to border studies literature, namely cultural identity. In fact, much of the existing body of work on the Italo-Yugoslav border and its fate after the fall of Yugoslavia is focused precisely on issues of identity, and more broadly on the reshaping of social and cultural ties in the region. As with the studies of borders and memory, authors tend to differ in their evaluations of continuity and change. At one end of the spectrum we find Borut Brumen's study that details the disintegration of social ties and the accelerated formation of boundaries between 'us'
and 'them' on the Slovenian side of the Slovenian-Croatian border, along with the formation of new local identities paralleling the greater accentuation of national boundaries at state level. At the other end of the spectrum lies, among others, the work of Lidija Nikočević, whose research in the Croatian part of Istria suggests that local inhabitants were rather impervious to border changes and continued to defy national identifications promoted at state level, or used them instrumentally when it suited them. 42 As with the research on memory, such discussions of continuity and change in the context of border identity studies may profit from a closer consideration of the impact of generational differences.
Up to this point, the term 'generation' was used rather indiscriminately and its meaning was taken for granted, partly because some of the studies quoted make little effort to define the term precisely. However, as several authors have noted, the study of what is loosely referred to as 'generations' is often plagued by conceptual confusion, and by a lack of differentiation between the effects of birth cohort, age and life cycle. 43 Much of this confusion stems from the indiscriminate use of the term 'generation', which is sometimes taken to mean a group of individuals born at the same point in time (i.e. a birth cohort), while at other points refers to age (as in references to the 'older generation' and the 'younger generation') or to a status in the context of familial and kinship relations (as in references to the 'generation of fathers'
and the 'generation of sons'). Such indiscriminate use prevents us from distinguishing between the relative effects of, for instance, age and birth cohort, and acknowledging that 'because society changes, people in different cohorts age in different ways'. 44 Or,
to offer an example of relevance to the study of generations: the prominence of positive accounts of the past among older interviewees may well have to do with the universal effects of aging rather than actual shared historical experiences. To avoid such confusion, the analysis that follows will avoid the use of the term generation, except in connection with cohort (as in 'generational cohort'). The main focus of the analysis will be on differences between birth cohorts.
Sources and methods
The analysis presented in this article is based on two major types of sources:
interviews with local inhabitants of Nova Gorica on the one hand, and archival and secondary materials from local archives and libraries on the other hand. The use of archival sources compensated, at least in part, for the drawbacks of the interview sample. As pointed out in existing research on generations, an analysis based solely on a cross-sectional sample of interviews drawn from different generations at a single point in time cannot distinguish between the effects of cohorts and age, and hence further compounds the conceptual confusion mentioned earlier. 45 To tackle this problem, researchers have typically resorted to longitudinal data collection, often in the form of longitudinal sets of survey data. 
13 mid-1960s saw the vicinity of the border as an advantage, as a point of connection rather than isolation. To interpret these contrasting perceptions, we cannot rely solely on an analysis of the present and its ability to remould the past, but need to take into account the disparate historical experiences and discourses the two groups were exposed to. Put simply, the two groups built their perceptions of the border based to an important extent on their actual experiences with the border over the course of their life, and especially over the course of the formative years of early adulthood. To demonstrate this, the analysis is split into two parts, each focusing on one of the two generations. Each part starts with a reconstruction of life at the border in the period of greatest relevance to the interviewees and their memories.
A final note of clarification is in order before moving on to analysis. While this article focuses on differences between generational cohorts it is important to note that these never act in isolation from other social factors. As Eviatar Zeubavel argues, remembering is shaped within particular social environments that provide the context of our mnemonic socialization, first of all the family, but also other mnemonic communities we enter at different points in our lives, when we go to a new school, move to a new town or country, start a new job or join a local football team. 48 Given that an individual's position in the social structure to a large extent determines her or his membership in particular mnemonic communities, it makes sense to expect that the choice of interpretive frames and the selection of events remembered by a particular interviewee will vary with their age, gender, educational background, and other social coordinates. were paying more attention to public events were mostly better educated or came from families with a relatively high social position, which included for example a wife of a former major, and a daughter of a well-educated man with a high-level administrative position in a town near Nova Gorica. 49 In contrast, those whose narratives centred on private lives and included only vague references to public events mostly completed only primary education or came from rural or working class families.
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A similar pattern can be discerned among respondents born between the mid1950s and the mid-1960s. Interviewees with university level education tended to mention a greater range of public events. However, this was not necessarily the case if the interviewee was female; of the three university-educated female interviewees from this generation, only one organized her narrative to a significant extent around such events. 51 Compatible gender differences appear among interviewees who completed secondary education: male respondents mentioned at least some most recent political events such as the EU enlargement or Slovenia's entry into the Schengen area, while women with similar educational background focused almost exclusively on private experiences, and discussed political events only after being explicitly asked by the interviewer.
Taking into account such differences would doubtlessly further enrich the understanding of the dynamics of memory explored in this article. At the same time, however, it would also risk detracting from the clarity of analysis. The results presented on the pages that follow therefore focus solely on differences between generational cohorts.
The pre-war cohort: Living with the Iron Curtain
Before 1947, Nova Gorica was no more than a suburb of Gorizia/Görz -an important provincial centre that historically profited from the vicinity of the port-city of Trieste and from railway connections with Vienna built in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, when the region was under Austrian rule. 52 The period of growth ended with World War I, which left the city and the wider region territory. 54 The rest of the disputed territory was divided up between the two neighboring states. Most of Gorizia was annexed to Italy, with only its eastern suburbs and the railway station -the part of the city that would soon be transformed into Nova Gorica -going to Yugoslavia. 56 it was impossible to ignore the presence of the new border, which cut Solkan off from its erstwhile center, deprived many inhabitants of their source of revenue, and severely disrupted existing family and friendship relations. To address these losses, the new administration started developing plans for a new town -a 'new Gorizia'. As one of the speakers in Solkan promised: 'we will build an even more beautiful and progressive Gorizia'. 57 Despite such optimistic proclamations, however, the feelings of loss and dissatisfaction continued to shape the public discourse in the town for several months and years to come. As the newly established newspaper Nova Gorica proclaimed: 'We will build a New Gorizia, but we will nevertheless never give up the old one'. 58 The dissatisfaction with the territorial settlement was not the only reason for discontent at the time. All across Europe, the immediate post-war years were a time of extreme poverty, high rates of unemployment, and food scarcity. 59 In the immediate post-war years, the population in many parts of Europe was kept afloat with the help of foreign aid, including the shipments of food, medical supplies, and the industrial and agricultural equipment provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). Yugoslavia was no exception. 60 In 1947, however, the UNRRA began to be dissolved, and Yugoslavia refused to accept the US-led Marshall Plan that was meant to replace it. For the eastern suburbs of Gorizia and the surrounding settlements, the advent of the Yugoslav administration therefore brought not only an unsatisfactory territorial settlement, but also a temporary loss of Western aid. 61 Added to that was the general commotion and movement of people that had started already before 1947, but intensified with the implementation of the new border. 62 The familiar neighbouring villages, towns and cities, along with family members, fiancées, friends and property, suddenly became part of a foreign, politically hostile country. Surrounded by a climate of insecurity, unsure of how the new Yugoslav regime would treat them, and lured by messages disseminated through
Italian radio stations, many Italians, along with some Yugoslavs, decided to opt for Italian citizenship and flee to Italy. 63 The population that remained in Yugoslavia had to learn to live with a new socio-political landscape and to adapt to a new border regime that put an end to old patterns of work-related migration, family and friendship ties. Obtaining permission to cross the border into Italy could easily take several months, with the applicant being asked to supply additional documents or even visit the office in Ljubljana to explain why the visit to Italy was necessary. 64 
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The pre-annexation period was typically presented as a kind of 'golden age', compared to which everything else was marked by decline. The exact aspects that made the period so exceptional varied. For some, the early post-war years were associated with the freedom of national expression and a celebratory atmosphere, dancing and signing. 66 For others, the same period was associated primarily with economic recovery and an unlimited supply of employment opportunities:
Until they defined the border life was great for some. For me it was great, I worked in Gorizia and there was a huge range of opportunities for making profit, for earning.
[…] For me it was great. I had a job, there was lots of work. You could earn extra if you were willing to work. 67 Some interviewees, particularly those who were children at the time, also fondly remembered their encounters with the Allied Military Administration. They emphasised the kindness and generosity of the soldiers, mentioned food and gifts their received from them, and described the 'adventurous' rides on board of military jeeps, trucks, and even a small plane. 68 In light of such fond memories of the post-war years, it is hardly surprising that some interviewees were genuinely confused when the interviewer referred to those years as the period of 'allied occupation'. One respondent insisted that 'we had no such occupation', 69 while another explained that the term was simply inapplicable to the presence of Western Allies in the region. 70 In contrast to the 'golden age' of the Allied Military Government, the arrival of Yugoslav rule was most often associated with disappointment, sudden decline, isolation and fear. At that point, argued one interviewee, 'an Iron Curtain was drawn'. 71 Although the interviewees acknowledged that the border regime changed over time and gradually became more liberal, the most vivid memories were associated with the early years and the first experiences with the new territorial division, which were uniformly negative. The reasons listed by the respondents were multiple, and included severe restrictions on movement imposed by the new border regime, disruption of ties with Gorizia, as well as shortages of food and other goods, censorship, and the hostile behaviour of Yugoslav soldiers. 72 The following excerpt provides a case in point:
After the annexation to Yugoslavia and the establishment of the border life turned worse. We were used to go to old Gorizia for shopping, for everything. I used to work there as well, in old Gorizia. So everything changed. And on top of that the attitude of the state at the time, or the soldiers that were guarding the border, was bad, extremely bad.
[…] There was nothing in the shops; pictures of our leaders in shop windows, but otherwise nothing. 73 Also common were recollections of the 'strangeness' of life with a border, and the feeling of being isolated from the rest of the world. 'We were not even allowed to look over there, nothing was allowed … We were more or less locked in', 74 explained one interviewee, while another spoke of being 'cut off' from the rest of the world.
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Memories of extreme isolation often mingled with memories of scarcity, poverty and feelings of loss, as in the following passage:
It was bad. First of all they took Gorizia, that was one thing, and then there was such discipline, you could not even get near the border, let alone run across. We could not get any goods; we could not go over there.' 76 Another frequently raised issue was the fear and resentment provoked by the Yugoslav border guards. The interviewees were talking about how they dreaded any contact with the guards, described their intrusive procedures, repeatedly complained about their rudeness, and mentioned examples of various sanctions and imprisonment for people who were caught smuggling. 77 For one respondent, the guards' behaviour was so unbearable that it made them akin to 'devils':
They did not allow us to go down-there, nor to speak … The devil was shouting at me: 'Can't you read Slovenian, comrade?' That was because I was speaking to Ivana who had a bar down there. … Yes, she had a bar. I
was not even allowed to look at her. I was standing here, and she was standing there, you see? And you weren't allowed to speak. And Hermina was down there, and my cousin and all of our family, and they all came up to the border. They were allowed to come to the border, but we were not.
The border guards were watching us through the border really sternly. . 86 The impact of economic reforms and increased cross-border traffic also resulted in a gradual recovery of the local economy. In the late 1950s, a new construction plan was adopted for Nova Gorica, and by the early 1960s, the development of the town finally took off. 87 The pace of population growth followed the rhythms of construction: after a period of to escape across the border to join her lover in Italy, 94 Lidija saw the same border as nothing more than a harmless fence, used as a net in children's ball games. 95 Other interviewees born in the 1950s and the 1960s also focused primarily on positive experiences: the relative freedom of movement brought by the introduction of special border passes for local inhabitants, the ability to buy goods in Italy and thereby have access to a far greater range of consumer goods than average Yugoslav citizens, the opportunity to experience a different socio-political systems and interact with a different culture etc. As one interviewee put it:
From the very beginning we felt, here at the border, somewhat privileged.
… It seemed really good, in particular if we were comparing ourselves to people up there in Ljubljana, and with those who came to Italy only every now and then, while we were there four times a month at first, once every week. And then later on, it was unlimited, which was great. We could go there and back regularly. 96 For the post-war cohort, the border was therefore associated with opportunities rather than obstacles, and functioned as a symbol of connection rather than isolation. The insurmountable, threatening divide that featured so prominently in the memories of the pre-war cohort was replaced with a far more permeable, 'open' border. To some extent, these notions of openness are anchored in the actual historical experiences of crossing the border, which were becoming far more common and straightforward thanks to the gradual liberalization of the border regime after 1955. Also important was the fact that for interviewees born after the war, the border was a part of normality, something they grew up with and learned to accept as given. Or, as one interviewee explained: 'as a child, I did not really feel the existence of the border; it simply felt self-evident that one had to show the border pass and so on'. 97 Another important factor shaping the recollections of the border were the discourses that had their roots in the socialist period. The changes in the border regime occurring from the mid-1950s onwards were accompanied by major shifts in public discourse: the border that separated Yugoslavia from its capitalist neighbours was increasingly referred to as 'the world's most open border'. This term, while clearly an exaggeration, 98 was also at the centre of the emerging local field of border studies that began attracting the attention of both Italian and Yugoslav authors from the 1970s onwards, 99 and became a part of mainstream political discourse not only on the Yugoslav, but also on the Italian side of the border. 100 The 
Closing remarks
The patterns of memory revealed in this article confirm that the study of postsocialist memories can profit from a closer engagement with recent debates in memory studies -in particular, the critique of presentism -as well as from a consideration of the growing body of research on memory and generational cohorts. It soon became clear, however, that these black-and-white formulas provide little insight into the actual processes of transformation. Many of the countries seemed unable to progress beyond the 'transitional' phase, and were plagued by corruption and low levels of political participation and public confidence. Faced with this outcome, several analysts abandoned the initial transition paradigm, and instead acknowledged the existence of multiple transformations, historical legacies and continuities. 106 It is time for researchers of post-socialist memory to do the same, abandon the initial fixation on mnemonic discontinuities and displacements, and adopt an approach that will do justice to the full complexity and ambiguities of postsocialist memory. The analysis of the cohort-based stratification of memory offers one possible venue, and a particularly fruitful one at that. 
